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The appellants Summit County, the Summit County Commission
and the Suicimit County Planning Commission (hereinafter referred
to collectively as "Summit County") and Utelite Corporation
("Utelite"), each defendants below, submit this Joint Brief of
Appellants.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by entering

findings of fact and a partial summary judgment on a disputed
factual record?
Standard of Review:
Issue of law—correctness.

Berenda v. Lancrford, 914 P. 2d

45, 50 (Utah 1996); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding,
909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah App. 1996).
Preservation of Issue:
Memoranda opposing partial summary judgment (R. 169-71, 18288); Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Proposed Order (R. 245-49); Utelite's Motion to Set
Aside Order for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 516-47).
2.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by

concluding that Summit County's actions leading to the placement
of the Utelite loading facility violated the Summit County
Development Code?

1

Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: same as
Issue 1 above.
3.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by

concluding that Summit County's actions leading to the placement
of the Utelite facility deprived the plaintiffs of due process of
law?
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: same as
Issue 1 above.
4.

Did the trial court err in determining that Summit

County acted in violation of the Utah Open and Public Meetings
Law, Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1, et seg.?
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: same as
Issue 1 above.
5.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by stating

in its order for partial summary judgment an intention to issue
an injunction requiring Summit County to effectuate the removal
of the Utelite loading facility?
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue: same as
Issue 1 above.
6.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by

determining that the Union Pacific Railroad was not a necessary
and indispensable party to this action?
Standard of Review:
Interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure—correctness.
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 909 P.2d 271, 272 (Utah
App. 1995); Berenda, supra, at 50.
2

Preservation of Issue;
Summit County's motion to dismiss for non-joinder
(R. 143-48); Utelite's memorandum in opposition to
plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (R. 169-71);
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Proposed Order (R. 247-48).
7.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in failing

to set aside the prior rulings and orders of Judge Wilkinson
which had been demonstrated during the course of later
proceedings to be in error?
Standard of Review:
Legal issue—correctness.

Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908

P.2d 862, 864-65 (Utah 1995).
Preservation of Issue:
Trial Transcript at 19 (R. 2369); Utelite's Motion to Set
Aside Order for Partial Summary Judgment and supporting
memorandum (R. 513-536); Utelite's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment re: Nuisance Per Se and supporting
memorandum (R. 1205-1223).
8.

Did the trial court commit error in concluding that

violation of the Summit County Development Code constituted a
legally sufficient basis for a claim of nuisance per se?
Standard of Review:
Legal issue—correctness.

Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908

P.2d 862, 864-65 (Utah 1995).

3

Preservation of Issue:
Trial Transcript at 19-20; Utelite Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Re: Nuisance Per Se (R. 1205-2 3).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8.

Suit to void final action—Limitation—

Exceptions.
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3
and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be
commenced within 90 days after the action except that
with respect to any final action concerning the
issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days
after the action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
This action was litigated for nearly six years in Third
District Court for Summit County before a number of different
judges.

The convoluted procedural history and confusing results

reflect the limitations of the system of rotating judges still
employed in Summit County.

See Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,

438-40 (Utah 1993) (Orme, Ct. App. J. concurring).

By resolving

fact issues on summary judgment and otherwise misapplying the law
in the first substantive ruling in this action, Judge Homer
Wilkinson introduced error that went uncorrected and continued to
taint later proceedings and to perplex subsequent judges who
handled the case.

This Court should correct both that threshold

error and all subsequent errors flowing from it.

4

Nature of the Case
The plaintiffs seek injunctive and monetary relief with
respect to Summit County's approval and Utelite's placement of a
rail car loading facility (the "Facility") in the vicinity of the
plaintiffs' property in the unincorporated area of Summit County
known as Echo, Utah.

The case proceeded in two stages:

(a)

litigation of claims for injunctive relief against Summit County
based on alleged procedural defects in the approval of the
Facility (resolved by summary judgment in 1991/93) and (b)
litigation of claims for equitable and monetary relief based on
nuisance per se (resolved by partial summary judgment and by
trial to the jury and the court in 1995/96).
Course of Proceedings
The Claims Against Summit County
The plaintiffs commenced this action on July 31, 1990, by
filing a Complaint naming the Summit County entities as
defendants.

The plaintiffs alleged that, in approving the

placement of a loading facility in Echo, Utah (the "Facility"),
Summit County (a) had failed to afford the plaintiffs due
process, (b) had abused its discretion, (c) had violated the
Summit County Development Code, (d) had violated the Open
Meetings Act, and (e) had otherwise acted contrary to "statutes,
ordinances and common law."

(R. 1-14)

On November 2, 1990, the

plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, naming Utelite as a
defendant, but without advancing any new theories and without
stating any specific claims against Utelite.
5

(R. 62)

On April 19, 1991, the plaintiffs moved for Summary Judgment
against Summit County.

(R. 104)

Utelite was not named as a

party to that motion.17
On May 9, 1991, Summit County and Utelite moved to dismiss
the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) because the plaintiffs had
failed to join as a party defendant the owner of the property on
which Utelite had built the Facility—the Union Pacific Railroad
(the "Railroad").

(R. 143, 161)

The motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss
were heard on July 8, 1991, by Judge Homer Wilkinson.-7

The

trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and denied
the motion to dismiss.

At the hearing, Judge Wilkinson observed:

I do decline to grant their [the plaintiffs'] Motion for a
Cease and Desist Order and for a Writ of Injunction. That I
don't know what the parties intend to do concerning this
matter—I probably think I do. But I think that if I issue
that cease and desist order, that could put them out of
business. It could do irreparable damages to them during
the appellate procedure. And I think that the parties could
be further injured by that, but I think that could be some
monetary damages. And therefore, I am going to grant the
Motion for Summary Judgment but refuse to grant the Motion
for Injunctive Relief to cease and desist.
However, I will indicate that if this matter is not taken
further, within 30 or 60 days, that the injunctive relief
would be granted. And I am certainly not advising you to

- The plaintiffs stated: "At the outset it should be noted that
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is limited to claims against Summit
County and does not seek relief from Utelite." (R. 204)
- Because of rotating assignments to the Third District Court, Summit
County, and the duration of these proceedings, various judges have heard this
action: Judge Wilkinson, Judge Young, Judge Iwasaki, Judge Brian and Judge
Noel.
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appeal the case, but in my own mind I can see that there is
probably not much chance that you are not going to.
(R. 235-242 attached as Addendum 1.)-'
On August 22, 1991, the plaintiffs lodged with the Court
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law together with a
proposed Order granting the Summary Judgment.

(R. 245)

Despite

an October 15, 1991, hearing on Summit County's objections to the
form of these, the proposed Findings and Conclusions and the
proposed Order remained unsigned for nearly two years.
(R. 265-71, 275)
On July 26, 1993, the trial court issued an Order to Show
Cause why the action should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute.

(R. 275)

At an August 23, 1993, hearing on the Order

to Show Cause, Judge Wilkinson finally entered the Findings and
Conclusions and Order Granting Summary Judgment tendered in
August 1991.

(R. 278, 282 attached hereto as Addenda 2 and 3)

The Order found that, in "the emplacement of the Utelite
Facility," Summit County had violated the Summit County
Development Code, the Open and Public Meetings Law, Utah Code
Ann. § 52-4-1, and the due process rights of the plaintiffs.
(A. 3:1)

The Order denied the motion to dismiss.

In pertinent

part, the Order provided (A. 3:2):
The effectiveness of this order is stayed for sixty (60)
days from the date this order is entered. If no appeal is
taken within that time period, then an injunction shall
issue and Defendant Summit County shall be required to

- References to the Addendum shall be "A." followed by the number of the
attachment and the specific page number within of that attachment cited.
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effectuate the removal of Utelite from their currently
occupied site.
Summit County filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal with
the Utah Supreme Court on September 13, 1993, which the Supreme
Court denied by order dated October 28, 1993.
The Claims Against Utelite
At a pretrial conference held on February 14, 1994, Judge
David Young granted the plaintiffs leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint.

(R. 303)

On March 11, 1994, the plaintiffs filed

their Second Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief stating for the first time damage claims
against Utelite.

The plaintiffs' claims against Utelite included

"common law nuisance," "statutory nuisance," "trespass,"
"negligence," "infliction of emotional distress," and "attorney's
fees and expenses."

(R. 304-42)

As to Summit County, the

plaintiffs sought an award of attorney's fees.
On November 4, 1994, the plaintiffs sought leave to file a
Third Amended Complaint to add claims regarding an alleged public
right-of-way affected by the placement of the Facility.

(R. 779)

The trial court entered an order dated March 13, 1995, denying
any further amendment because it would necessarily involve adding
the Railroad as a party thus delaying the proceedings.

(R. 1024-

27)
Utelite gave notice on July 14, 1995, of its request that,
notwithstanding the plaintiffs' request for a jury trial, the
judge determine all equitable issues including any claim for
injunctive relief.

(R. 1734-35)
8

By Order dated September 6, 1995, Judge Pat Brian entered
partial summary judgment in favor of Utelite dismissing the
claims for infliction of emotional distress and for award of
attorney's fees, the latter without prejudice to the plaintiffs'
renewal of the claim at the conclusion of trial•

(R. 1766-68

attached as Addendum 4•)
The remaining claims against Utelite came on for trial
before Judge Frank G. Noel on September 12, 1995.

Before the

commencement of trial, the court ruled that (a) Judge Wilkinson's
1993 Order for Partial Summary Judgment implicitly included a
finding that the Utelite loading facility violated the Summit
County Development Code and (b) by reason of this violation the
Facility was a nuisance per se.

(R. 2365-69)

Given this finding

of liability, the parties stipulated to dismissal without
prejudice of all other claims of liability leaving only the
issues of actual damages and punitive damages for the jury and
the issue of equitable relief for the court.

(R. 2368-69)

The jury heard evidence from September 12 through 15, 1995,
and returned a verdict awarding general damages for the six and
one-half year time period from April 24, 1989, through
September 15, 1995, in the following nominal amounts: Jane and
Richard Harper—$5,000 each; Frank Cattelan—$3,000; and Richard
Richins—$1,500.^

The jury found that the plaintiffs had not

suffered any reduction in the market value of their property or,
in the case of the plaintiff Cattelan, any business injury.
-

The plaintiffs had sought general damages in excess of $250,000.
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The

jury a l s o found t h a t the p l a i n t i f f s were not e n t i t l e d t o any
exemplary damages.

(R. 1988-90)

On February 13, 1996, the t r i a l court entered i t s Final
Judgment on Special Verdict denying t h e Harpers any further
e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f and otherwise entering Judgment c o n s i s t e n t with
the j u r y ' s Special Verdict.
Addendum 5.)

(R. 2097-2102 attached as

On April 23, 1996, pursuant t o the Utah Open

Meetings Act, the t r i a l court entered i t s Order Re: Award of
P l a i n t i f f s ' A t t o r n e y ' s Fees awarding t o the p l a i n t i f f s
Summit County the sum of $11,150.

(R. 2322-23)

against

On May 10, 1996,

the t r i a l court entered i t s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Re: Equitable Relief

finding:

The F a c i l i t y a t present (a) i s not injurious t o t h e
p l a i n t i f f s , (b) does not adversely affect the p l a i n t i f f ' s
use and enjoyment of t h e i r property, and (c) does not cause
any property damage t o the p l a i n t i f f s .
(R. 2332-36 attached as Addendum 6.)

This completed a l l

proceedings in t h e t r i a l court, and Summit County and U t e l i t e
j o i n t l y noticed t h e i r appeal on May 31, 1996.- ;
STATEMENT OF FACTS
U t e l i t e and t h e R a i l r o a d

U t e l i t e mines and processes lightweight aggregate a t i t s
p l a n t near Peoa, Utah.

(R. 2831)

Until 1989, U t e l i t e loaded

aggregate for o u t - o f - s t a t e shipment via the R a i l r o a d ' s Park City
-' To avoid any contention that they had f a i l e d t o preserve t h e i r r i g h t
t o appeal, Summit County and U t e l i t e had previously noticed an appeal in
response t o the February 13, 1996, Final Judgment on Special Verdict on
March 4, 1996. Based on a review of the docketing statements submitted in
support of t h o s e appeals and cross-appeals in Case No. 960121, the Utah
Supreme Court, by Order entered May 31, 1996, dismissed the appeal without
prejudice for lack of f i n a l i t y .
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branch line at a portable loading facility next to the Spring
Chicken Inn in Wanship, Utah,

(R. 2836)

The Railroad owns a right-of-way through the unincorporated
town of Echo, Utah.

This right-of-way includes two main

transcontinental line tracks along with a passing track and an
"industry track.11
Echo since 1869.

(R. 2816-18)
(R. 1673)

The Railroad has operated in

In the past, the Railroad has

operated a loading facility and a railroad yard at the Echo
right-of-way.

(R. 2616-17)

In 1988, the Railroad obtained regulatory authority to
abandon its Park City branch line.

(R. 2802)

To secure

Utelite's agreement to the abandonment of the Park City line, the
Railroad offered (a) to lease property at the Echo right-of-way
to Utelite on favorable terms and (b) to defray certain expenses
associated with Utelite's establishment of a loading facility at
the Echo right-of-way.

(R. 2839)

Utelite accepted the

Railroad's offer and commenced preparations to construct a new
loading facility on the industry track at the Echo right-of-way.
(R. 2839-40)
Utelite and Summit County
As part of those preparations, Utelite inquired of Summit
County regarding any regulatory approval needed to construct the
Facility.

(R. 559)

Summit County suggested that Utelite attend

a December 13, 1988, meeting of the Summit County Planning
Commission to verify what permits or other approvals might be
needed to construct the Facility.
11

(Id.)

Utelite officer Carsten Mortensen ("Mortensen") attended the
December 13, 1988, meeting of the Summit County Planning
Commission to inquire regarding any needed governmental approval.
Summit County Planning Commission officials at the meeting
indicated to Mortensen that the placement of the Facility on the
Railroad's industry track was a "permitted use" consistent with
the historic use of the property as a railroad siding and loading
site.

Mortensen understood from this that placement of the

Facility did not require any special action by the Planning
Commission.

(Id.)

Summit County confirmed this by a letter

dated January 13, 1989.

(R. 122 attached as Addendum 7.)

Utelite completed the Facility and commenced operations
there on April 24, 1989.
Utelite and the Plaintiffs
The plaintiffs own property near the Facility.

The

Railroad's tracks through Echo lie between the Facility and the
property of all plaintiffs but Richins (whose property lies west
of 1-84).

Trains pass through Echo on these tracks between 15

and 2 0 times per day.

(A. 6:2)

Semi-trucks transport aggregate to the Facility for loading.
Weekly at the Facility, Utelite loads on average six and one-half
railroad cars.

To load a single railroad car requires four

truckloads and a total of 40 minutes loading time.

The Facility

currently operates, with occasional exceptions, on weekdays
during daylight hours.

(A. 6:2)

12

The plaintiffs have complained that the Facility generates
intolerable levels of dust and noise.

To deal with dust from the

loading operations, Utelite has taken the following steps:
(a)

Construction of a metal enclosure at the Facility.

(b)

Installation of a bag house and duct work at the
Facility.

(c)

Paving of the access road to the Facility.

(d)

Installation of curtains and an electric door at
the Facility.

(e)

Watering down aggregate at the Utelite plant.

(f)

Installation of a hood and metal coverings over
the conveyor belt and drop areas at the Facility.

(g)

Response to resident complaints called in to the
Utelite plant including termination of loading on
windy days. (A. 6:3)

To deal with noise problems from the operation of the
Facility, Utelite has taken the following steps:
(a)

Installation of a muffler on the bag house.

(b)

Instruction to truckers not to bang railroad cars
in connection with loading. (A. 6:3)

.To deal with other annoyances, Utelite has:
(a)

Removed outdoor lighting at the Facility.

(b)

Terminated night loading.

(c)

Instructed truck drivers to yield to other
vehicles seeking access to the frontage road on
the far side of Interstate 84 through the road at
the Facility. (A. 6:3, 4)

As a result of the actions taken by Utelite, the Facility at
present (a) is not injurious to the plaintiffs, (b) does not
adversely affect the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their
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property, and (c) does not cause any property damage to the
plaintiffs.

(A. 6:4)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The fundamental error which tainted all further proceedings
in this action occurred when Judge Homer Wilkinson resolved
disputed questions of material fact on a motion for partial
summary judgment.

The transcript of the Judge7s Bench Ruling

amply demonstrates that the trial court improperly considered the
weight, persuasiveness and credibility of the evidence on at
least three (3) critical disputed factual issues.

The court then

entered findings of fact that ignored those critical factual
disputes and afforded no support for the conclusions of law.
Judge Wilkinson compounded this fundamental deficiency when
he erroneously determined:
(a)

Summit County's interpretation of its Development
Code in response to Utelite's inquiry regarding
the proposed construction of the Facility violated
the Development Code and was therefore null and
void.

(b)

This interpretation deprived plaintiffs of due
process of law.

(c)

The plaintiffs could wait over 18 months to
challenge Summit County's course of dealings with
Utelite under the Utah Open Meetings Law.

(d)

The modest procedural defect identified by the
trial court required the removal of the Utelite
facility.

(e)

The Union Pacific Railroad was not a necessary and
indispensable party to a judicial determination
regarding the historical, present and future use
of its property and facilities in Echo, Utah.
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The various other judges who heard various aspects of later
proceedings in this case declined to correct Judge Wilkinson by
revisiting his earlier erroneous ruling•
The plaintiffs' damage claims against Utelite proceeded to a
jury trial based, in part, on Judge Frank Noel's reliance on the
implication in Judge Wilkinson's earlier ruling that there was a
zoning violation.

From this Judge Noel erroneously concluded

that the continued operation of the Facility was a nuisance per
se.

These fundamental errors in the decisions of the trial court

should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST SUMMIT COUNTY ON A DISPUTED
FACTUAL RECORD.
Judge Wilkinson "adopt[ed]" Findings of Fact in granting

partial summary judgment.

(A. 2:1)

On their face, the findings

do not disclose whether the trial court viewed them as undisputed
facts or findings from evidence that "persuaded11 the court.
A. 1:4, In. 3.)

(See

If the findings are true factual determinations

from a disputed record, they are inappropriate and require
reversal.

If the findings purport to state all "undisputed

facts" material to determination of the motion for partial
summary judgment, there are clearly several material facts not
addressed by the trial court that are in dispute.
Summary judgment requires the absence of any genuine issue
of material fact.

Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P.

"xThe trial court

must not weigh the evidence or assess credibility7 in a summary
15

judgment."

Dubois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah

App. 1994) quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin,
Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984).

"If summary

judgment is proper . . . , the material facts are, by definition,
undisputed and there are no facts which the court has to

find."

Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168-69 (Utah App. 1989)
(emphasis in original).

Thus, a court need not enter findings of

fact in ruling on a motion for summary judgment and any such
findings invite scrutiny.

See, e.g., Rule 52(a), Utah R.

Civ. P.; Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 125 (Utah
1994).
Judge Wilkinson's ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on their
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment required resolution of
disputed fact issues.

The key threshold fact at issue was

whether Summit County's course of dealings with Utelite in
December 1988 and January 1989 could somehow be characterized as
constituting a legislative exercise of the zoning power resulting
in an amendment to the Summit County Development Code effectively
rezoning the property in question, as opposed to merely an
administrative inquiry into the interpretation and application of
Summit County's Development Code as applied to a specific
proposed use or activity.
The plaintiffs asserted that "[o]n December 13, 1988,
Utelite went before the Summit County Planning Commission
approval

for construction of the facility in Echo."
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(R. 103

seeking

[emphasis added])-7

All Utelite or Summit County have ever

acknowledged was that H[t]he President of Utelite Corporation
dropped into a Planning Commission meeting on December 13, 1988,
to inquire as to the zoning in Echo."

(R. 183)

In connection

with a later Motion to Set Aside the Partial Summary Judgment,
Utelite's president submitted his affidavit that "he attended the
December 13, 1988, meeting . . . to inquire regarding the
necessity of a building permit and any other required
governmental approvals."

(R. 550)

of Carsten Mortensen at 65-71).

See also

R. 2114 (Deposition

Summit County's confirming

letter stated the following about the December 13, 1988, contact:
"It was the consensus of the Commission that the Utelite
operation . . . could be moved to the Echo location.
be considered a permitted use at the Echo site."

This would

(A. 7)

In his Finding 2, Judge Wilkinson resolved this dispute.
Without explanation, he adopted the plaintiffs' characterization
of the Utelite/Summit County contacts as "seeking approval for
the construction."

(R. 279)

Although he never so stated

expressly, it appears that Judge Wilkinson viewed Summit County's
response to Utelite's inquiry as the functional equivalent of a
legislative decision amending the provisions of the Summit County
Development Code resulting in the rezoning of the property in

- Although the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relied upon Uteliters
discovery responses, the appellants' review of the record on appeal disclosed
for the first time that these were not submitted to the trial court. (R. 10442) See Rule 4-502(3), Code of Judicial Administration. The actual language
of the interrogatory answers cited in the motion did not admit that Utelite
ever sought any approval.

17

question rather than simply an administrative decision
interpreting the existing provisions of the Development Code in
response to Utelite's inquiry regarding the proposed construction
of the loading facility.

Most of the remaining error in this

action flowed from that critical unwarranted and unexplained
resolution of a disputed issue of material fact.

Despite the

efforts of Utelite and Summit County to obtain reconsideration of
this error up to the very commencement of trial, no other judge
would revisit the merits of Judge Wilkinson's decision.

(R. 245,

513 and 2369)
Judge Wilkinson himself acknowledged the factual dispute
regarding the nature of the Summit County/Utelite contacts:
[W]hen you say that the president of Utelite walked into a
meeting and discussed this and then the administrator sends
him a letter and says, Go ahead and do it, that it's a
permitted use, it just doesn't wash with this Court that the
activities can be carried on in that manner.
(A. 1:3 Ins. 10-15; emphasis added.)
The court clearly did not like what it had heard of the
Utelite/Summit County contacts, but a hearing on a motion for
partial summary judgment was not the place to evaluate the meager
record.

This impatience led Judge Wilkinson to commit error in

deciding on a disputed record that Utelite "sought approval" from
Summit County.
Closely related to the factual dispute over "approval" is a
second factual dispute over the Railroad's long-established
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nonconforming use of i t s Echo right-of-way- 7 and the placement of
the F a c i l i t y on t h a t r i g h t - o f - w a y .

Judge Wilkinson s t a t e d :

[ I ] t r e a l l y b o i l s down t o a question of whether they adhered
t o t h a t Code or they did not adhere t o the Code, and the
q u e s t i o n of whether i t ' s a permitted use under the Code or
i t was a nonconforming u s e . And I am not persuaded. I am
not persuaded t h a t t h e r e i s a f a c t u a l i s s u e t h a t ' s present
as far as the Development Code i s concerned.
(A. 1:3 I n s . 23-25, 1:4 I n s . 1-2; emphasis added.)

Judge

Wilkinson apparently concluded t h a t Summit County was mistaken in
viewing the F a c i l i t y as a "permitted u s e . "
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s do not i d e n t i f y any f a c t s ,
d i s p u t e d or undisputed, t o support t h i s view of t h e R a i l r o a d ' s
u s e ; t h e evidence otherwise demonstrates t h a t t h e R a i l r o a d ' s use
of i t s r i g h t - o f - w a y was very much in d i s p u t e .

Summit County

h i g h l i g h t e d t h i s i s s u e i n correspondence with the p l a i n t i f f s '
counsel dated February 13, 1990, f i l e d as an e x h i b i t in
o p p o s i t i o n t o the motion for p a r t i a l summary judgment.
01 attached as Addendum 8.)

(R. 200-

The Railroad l a t e r f i l e d an

a f f i d a v i t regarding i t s use in connection with t h e motion for
reconsideration.

(R. 553-55)

Finally, several witnesses

t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l regarding past use of the r i g h t - o f - w a y for
loading purposes.

(R. 2615-18; 2794-98)

Judge Wilkinson was somehow "persuaded" t h a t the R a i l r o a d ' s
h i s t o r i c use of i t s r i g h t - o f - w a y did not s u f f i c e t o c r e a t e a

- A nonconforming use i s "[a] use which lawfully e x i s t e d prior t o the
enactment of a zoning ordinance, and which i s maintained a f t e r the e f f e c t i v e
date of the ordinance, although i t does not comply with the zoning
r e s t r i c t i o n s a p p l i c a b l e t o the d i s t r i c t in which i t i s s i t u a t e d . • . •"
Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, 4 ed. (1995) § 6.01 at 481-82.
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preexisting use and a valid accessory use.

However, on a motion

for partial summary judgment in the face of a factual dispute,
the trial court was not at liberty to favor one view of the
evidence over another.
The trial court itself identified a third area of factual
dispute: the nature and extent of any harm to the plaintiffs
caused by the alleged wrongs of Summit County.
But I am also mulling over in my mind as to the many factual
issues that might be there. By that I am saying this — and
counsel has argued that the parties had not been injured. 1
think he has a point to a certain extent. But I guess a
factual issue could be that they were parties that have or
are in the realm of injury or as he used the term, the
quality of life.
(A. 1:3 Ins. 16-22; emphasis added.)

The extent of any claimed

injury to the plaintiffs was an important fact consideration
where the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief that Judge
Wilkinson acknowledged on the record "could do irreparable harm"
to Utelite.

(R. 253:16)

Yet, the trial court's Order For

Partial Summary Judgment promises just such relief despite
remaining factual issues.
Judge Wilkinson committed error by implicitly deciding
several disputed issues of material fact in order to grant
partial summary judgment.

This Court should vacate those

findings and reverse the partial summary judgment.

The trial

court should consider all of the evidence regarding the
Utelite/Summit County contacts and the results of those contacts
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and only then determine whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
any relief.-7
II.

SUMMIT COUNTY'S ACTIONS DID NOT VIOLATE THE DEVELOPMENT CODE
AND, THEREFORE, JUDGE WILKINSON COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN HOLDING THEM NULL AND VOID.
Judge Wilkinson clearly concluded, without any support in

the record or legal analysis, that placement of the Facility on
the industry track in Echo was a substantive violation of the
Development Code.

(R. 255:18-22)

From the irrelevant and

legally inconsequential facts set forth in his findings, Judge
Wilkinson assumed an entire set of material facts not before him
and then made the leap to an erroneous legal conclusion.

Thus,

several years later at trial Judge Noel faced the central issue
to that point in the litigation—whether there was a substantive
zoning violation—and could find only an "implicit" ruling in the
1993 Order.

(R. 2366)

This implicit legal conclusion, aside

from being based on disputed facts and undisclosed assumptions,
was wrong as a matter of law.
No one can seriously dispute that the Railroad has operated
on its transcontinental right-of-way for over a century.

As

already noted, the Railroad in the past has operated a coal
loading facility and conducted other railroad operations in Echo.
Assuming that Summit County has jurisdiction over a federally

- Evidence of the Railroad's past use and the plaintiffs' alleged
injuries is now in the record as the result of the trial.
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granted right-of-way,- the Railroad's use of its right-of-way is
a valid nonconforming use predating the Development Code.
In his February 13, 1990, letter to counsel (A. 8 ) , Deputy
County Attorney Franklin P. Andersen stated Summit County's
position with respect to the allegation of a zoning violation:
I don't believe we are concerned with a zoning issue, but
rather a use issue[:] . . . whether loading aggregate into
train cars is a use associated with railroading activities
in the Echo railroad yards.
In this instance, the railroad yard uses are non-conforming
as defined in Summit County's Development Code, Section
1.6(52). Transportation of freight is the very essence of
the railroad business; loading and unloading of freight is
fundamental to that activity and is necessarily performed in
yards or depots. The activity of Utelite Corporation is a
"use customarily incidental to and located upon the
same . . . [property] . . . occupied by the main use and
devoted exclusively to the main use of the premises." It is
thus an accessory use subordinate, yet essential, to the
main railroading use. See Summit County Development Code,
Section 1.6(63).
In entering partial summary judgment, Judge Wilkinson implicitly
rejected this position without the least explanation why Summit
County's interpretation "just [didn't] wash with him . . . ."
(R. 237)
The plaintiffs' position, embraced similarly without
explanation by Judge Wilkinson, would greatly limit the
Railroad's use of its right-of-way.

The court gave no hint as to

what would be a "valid accessory use" of the Railroad's
admittedly valid preexisting use of its right-of-way.

While this

- Federal law governs a land grant right-of-way. Other courts have held
that state or county action cannot impair a railroad's rights derived from the
federal government. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
630 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1980), cert,
denied,
450 U.S. 995 (1981); Puett v.
Western Pacific Railroad Co., 752 P.2d 213 (Nev. 1988).
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determination is one of law, it

,n

can be answered only by

consideration of the underlying factual situation.'"
Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah App. 1992).

Alta v. Ben

Judge Wilkinson

proceeded as if there were no "factual situation."
This implicit legal conclusion led Judge Wilkinson to
consider whether Summit County had made a fundamentally
legislative decision on December 13, 1988, to change the zoning
designation of the Railroad's property.

Judge Wilkinson found

that Summit County had made a formal "zoning decision" in the
sense of exercising the legislative power to amend the provisions
of the Summit County Development Code with respect to the
Railroad's property as opposed to merely stating its
administrative interpretation of the relevant provisions of the
Development Code.
The record shows the following sequence of relevant events:
1.

The president of Utelite contacted Jerry Smith, a

member of the Summit County planning staff, to inquire whether a
building permit was required for construction of the Facility at
Echo.

(R. 2114 at 65-67)
2.

In response, Smith stated his belief that there would

be no building permit or other requirements, but suggested that
Utelite confirm this with the Planning Commission.

(R. 2114 at

70; R. 550)
3.

Before the Planning Commission on December 13, 1988,

Mr. Smith told the Planning Commission what Utelite proposed and
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what he had stated in response and asked whether the Planning
Commission agreed with him.
4.

(R. 2114 at 68-71)

The Planning Commission indicated its agreement with

Smith's statements to Utelite.
took less than five minutes.

The entire informal discussion
(R. 2114 at 71)

To characterize this as a legislative exercise of the zoning
power is to transform a citizen's casual request for information
into a full-blown deliberation by a public body.

Such routine

"over-the-counter" inquiries are made on a daily basis in
jurisdictions all over the state of Utah.

In this case, the

trial court improperly characterized that routine inquiry and
response as somehow constituting a procedural violation of the
Development Code.
The Court and the parties can only speculate as to the
reasoning behind Judge Wilkinson's conclusion that Summit County
violated its own Development Code. However, Summit County's
conclusion remains undisputed:

the activity of loading rail cars

on an industry track in a railroad yard on a railroad right-ofway in a transportation corridor constitutes an accessory use to
the pre-existing use of rail traffic.

Conversely, the course of

dealings between Summit County and Utelite cannot fairly be
characterized as a legislative exercise of the zoning power
resulting in an amendment to the Development Code with respect to
the use of the Railroad's property.

At a minimum, this Court

should reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand for
appropriate findings.
24

III. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
ACTIONS OF SUMMIT COUNTY DEPRIVED PLAINTIFFS OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.
Without explanation, Judge Wilkinson found that Summit
County had not afforded the plaintiffs due process.

To find a

lack of due process under the U. S. Constitution, a court must
determine whether there is a protected liberty or property
interest and, if so, what procedures are required to satisfy due
process requirements. —
(1976).

See also

Matthews v. Eldredcre, 424 U.S. 319

Gray v. Dep't of Employment Security, 681 P.2d

807, 816 (Utah 1984)

(M[t]he prerequisites to the application of

due process protections are:

(1) state action and (2) a

constitutionally protected liberty or property interest").
In this action, both the plaintiffs and the trial court
employed the term "due process" without the slightest heed to its
legal content.

The plaintiffs did not allege or prove the

existence of a protected property interest.

They made no showing

of what process was appropriate to protect their interests, much
less that they were deprived of that protection.

The court below

likewise failed to engage in the requisite due process analysis.
Even under circumstances where such allegations were
adequately supported by the record, a mere violation of the Utah
Open and Public Meetings Law does not rise to the level of a
deprivation of due process.

First, the right created by the

statute is a legislatively created right, not a fundamental

—
The demonstration of a property interest is also required under the
state constitution* See The Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Utah 1982).
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property or liberty right.
seq.

Second, Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1, et

provides a remedy (i.e., process) to address the claims of

violation of the Open Meetings Act.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-8

through -10. Because there is a process available, there is no
basis for claiming denial of due process.

See

Smith v. Colorado

Dep't of Corrections, 23 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1994)
("Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees pertaining to
property are satisfied when an adequate, state post-deprivation
remedy exists for deprivations. . . . " ) .
The core issue remains whether the course of dealings
between Utelite and Summit County was administrative in
character, not requiring notice and hearing, or a fundamental
exercise of legislative discretion resulting in a rezoning of the
Railroad7s property which would require notice and hearing in
order to satisfy due process requirements.

The sole evidence

before the trial court was that the activities were
administrative.

Absent demonstration of a protected interest and

identification of the proper process to protect that interest, no
finding of lack of due process can logically or legally follow.
The trial court's determination that Summit County deprived the
plaintiffs of due process is erroneous and should be reversed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT SUMMIT COUNTY'S
ACTIONS VIOLATED THE OPEN MEETINGS LAW.
The Utah Open Meetings Law provides that any "final action"

taken in violation of the provisions of the statute is "voidable"
if suit is "commenced within 90 days after the action . . .,f
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8.

The undisputed facts in this case
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establish that plaintiffs waited until July 31, 1990,
approximately 16-1/2 months late, to file an action despite the
commencement of construction on or about February 21, 1989
(R. 128), the first loading of railroad cars on April 15, 1989
(R. 109), and receipt of correspondence from the Deputy County
Attorney outlining the County's position in considerable detail
on February 13, 1990.

(A. 8)

In the face of those undisputed facts, Judge Wilkinson,
without any explanation, accepted the plaintiffs' argument that
the statute was subject to "equitable tolling.flli/
2:3)

(R. 224; A.

By this, he presumably meant that facts existed to place

the Summit County/Utelite contacts within the ambit of the
discovery rule articulated in Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84
(Utah 1981).

(R. 225)

The statute would be tolled if Summit

County engaged in concealment of facts or there existed
"exceptional circumstances that render the application of a
statute of limitations irrational or unjust . . . ." Warren v.
Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992).

What evidence persuaded Judge Wilkinson to invoke the
"equitable tolling doctrine" is yet another mystery for, aside
from a single conclusion of law (No. 4), he offered no
explanation for his ruling.

(A. 2:3)

The plaintiffs argued that

the very omissions that constituted the violation of the Act—

—' "Equitable tolling" is a doctrine developed in the federal courts
that "permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if
despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on
the existence of his claim." Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446,
451 (7th Cir, 1990), No reported Utah case has used this terra.
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failure to give notice and to keep minutes—were the "exceptional
circumstances" leading to concealment of the claim:

"the very

actions of which Plaintiffs complain also served to conceal the
violations of the Act."

(R. 225)

If lack of notice, absence of minutes or the secret nature
of a meeting sufficed to permit equitable tolling, the 90-day
limitations period, which has no express tolling provision, would
be a nullity.

Any meeting covered by the statute would

necessarily afford the basis for a claim of equitable tolling.
As applied by Judge Wilkinson, the equitable tolling
doctrine suspends forever the 90-day limitations period.
limitations period was not tolled; it was eliminated.

The

This

extraordinary conclusion requires a determination that neither
construction of the Facility, commencement of operations, nor
even Summit County's pointed correspondence with the plaintiffs'
attorney (A. 8) put the plaintiffs on notice; they were free to
file their Open Meetings Act claim at their leisure.
The 90-day limitation on voiding final action for noncompliance with the open and public meetings statutes seeks
finality with respect to governmental action.

The application of

the Act now before this Court contradicts that policy.

However

one characterizes the December 13, 1988, contact, Utelite was
entitled to (and did in fact) rely on the representations then
made.

To void any such action, the plaintiffs had to file an

action by March 13, 1989.

Instead of doing so, they watched as

construction proceeded on the Facility.
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Sixteen and one-half

months late they sued to void the purported "final action." By
then, the facility was built and had been in operation for over a
year.

The policy of finality mandates the application of the

statute of limitations.

This Court should reverse the partial

summary judgment on the Open Meetings Act claim and vacate the
award of fees under Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-9(2).
Should the Court somehow determine the 90-day statute of
limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-8 does not apply to these
facts and circumstances, then it would become necessary to
evaluate the merits of the plaintiffs' claim alleging a violation
of the Open Meetings Law.

It is important to note in that

context that the plaintiffs do not dispute the adequacy of the
notice for the December 13, 1988, Summit County Planning
Commission meeting.

Rather, they focus on the level of detail

required in the agenda for that meeting.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the plaintiffs' position
would require specific notice and publication in the agenda of
every single item discussed at a public meeting, no matter how
ministerial or insignificant.
reason.

This argument fails the test of

It is common for a public body of a local governmental

unit subject to the Open Meetings Law to permit time for broad
citizen input or staff reports as part of a meeting agenda
without specific notice.

Convening such a public body for the

limited purposes of discussing or implementing administrative or
operational matters is not even defined as a meeting to which the
provisions of the statute apply.
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Utah Code Ann.

§ 52-4-2(2) (b) (ii)•

It logically follows that such routine

operational issues do not require a separate listing on the
agenda and are not regarded as the type of "final action" to
which the provisions of the Act apply.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ORDERING THE SHUTDOWN OF
THE UTELITE FACILITY.
The confusion underlying Judge Wilkinson's findings and

substantive legal conclusions extends to his articulation of the
relief granted.

At the hearing on the motion, the trial court

stated unequivocally:

"I purposely am not issuing the injunctive

relief."

The judge noted that issuance of

(R. 240:25)

injunctive relief "could put them [Utelite] out of business.
could do irreparable damages to them . . . ."

It

(R. 238:15-16)

The Order For Partial Summary Judgment itself reads:
The effectiveness of this order is stayed for sixty (60)
days from the date this order is entered. If no appeal is
taken within that time period, then an injunction shall
issue and Defendant Summit County shall be required to
effectuate the removal of Utelite from their currently
occupied site.
(A. 3:2)

This language promises future equitable relief for the

plaintiffs; yet once again, neither the findings nor the
underlying record set forth evidence to warrant that relief.
The plaintiffs and the trial court rely on Utah Code Ann.
§ 17-27-23 (1990, repealed July 1, 1992) to claim injunctive
relief.

That section authorized "any owner of real estate within

the county" to "institute injunction . . . proceedings to
prevent, enjoin, abate or remove the unlawful building, use or
act."

This statute has been construed not to require "a specific
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showing of irreparable injury . . . ."
635 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah 1981)•

Utah County v. Baxter,

(Note that the current version of

this statute permits only the county to obtain an injunction by
proof of a zoning violation alone.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 17-27-1002(1)(b).)
Judge Wilkinson proceeded as if he had no discretion in
fashioning a remedy for the perceived deviation from the
Development Code.

He ruled on an extremely limited fact record

and disregarded the known facts that would dictate a less
draconian remedy.

First, the court ignored the plaintiffs' delay

in bringing the action after they were aware of the construction,
the operation and any alleged annoyance.

Second, the court did

not take into consideration Utelite's abandonment of the Wanship
loading site at the Railroad's request.

By the August 23, 1993,

date of the partial summary judgment, Utelite had drastically
changed its position—the Railroad had abandoned the Park City
branch line and Utelite no longer had an acceptable existing
alternate site for loading.

Finally, the court overlooked the

difficult position of Summit County.

The Facility was at Echo

because Summit County told Utelite that the placement would
constitute a "permitted use."

Such facts could well support a

claim of "equitable estoppel" against the County.

See Alta v.

Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 802-03 (Utah App. 1992).
Judge Noel at trial in 1995 pursued an inquiry into the
facts that Judge Wilkinson failed to make in 1991.

"[S]olely by

reason of Judge Wilkinson's August 23, 1996, Order and the
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findings implicit in that ruling," Judge Noel "found . . . that
the Facility is a nuisance per se."

(R. 2335)

However, after

considering four days of testimony regarding Utelite's operation
of the Facility and "the Court's visit to the Facility while in
operation and the Court's and third-party's review of videos,
tapes and photographs of the Facility in operation," Judge Noel
found:
[T]he Facility at present (a) is not injurious to the
plaintiffs, (b) does not adversely affect the plaintiff's
[sic] use and enjoyment of their property, and (c) does not
cause any property damage to the plaintiffs.
(A. 6:4)

The court concluded that the plaintiffs "are not

entitled to any further equitable relief from this Court other
than the equitable relief previously granted by Judge Wilkinson."
(A. 6:5)
The plaintiffs have now had the opportunity to be heard with
respect to the merits of the placement of the Facility.

Judge

Noel (and the jury, which awarded only nominal damages even

after

being instructed that the Facility was a nuisance per se) found
against the plaintiffs on the merits.

To the extent the

plaintiffs claim entitlement to an additional administrative
hearing on any alleged zoning change or violation, the
appropriate remedy should be the granting of such a hearing, not
the closure and removal of the Facility.

Judge Wilkinson

committed error in identifying closure as the ultimate remedy in
his August 23, 1993, Order and that portion of the Order should
be reversed.
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VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD WAS NOT A NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THIS
ACTION.
The Railroad owns the right-of-way on which Utelite built

the Facility.

The plaintiffs alleged and the trial court ruled

that, as a matter of law, the Railroad could not use its rightof-way in Echo to load the goods of rail customers such as
Utelite.

At the same time, the plaintiffs argued and the trial

court agreed that the Railroad was not an indispensable party to
an action adjudicating its use of the right-of-way.

This ruling

was error.
Rule 19, Utah R. Civ. P., governs joinder of indispensable
parties:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the
action if . . . he claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may . . . as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest.
(Emphasis added).
A party who must be present for a full and fair
determination of his rights as well as the rights of the other
parties is an indispensable party.

Call v. City of West Jordan,

788 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (Utah App. 1990).

"The purpose of the

rule is to guard against the entry of judgments which might
prejudice the rights of such parties in their absence."

Cowen

and Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah
1984) ; see also

Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Coinm/n v.

Thompson Michie Assoc, Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986) ("A
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plaintiff may not obtain relief adverse to the property rights of
others who are not adverse parties to the case without bringing
them before the court").
The Railroad is an indispensable party whose property rights
are directly impacted by this litigation.

Judge Wilkinson's

Bench Ruling acknowledged as much:
I am also denying the Motion that the Union Pacific Railroad
is an indispensable party. This Court is not convinced that
it is. The parties entered into a contract with Utelite,
and it will affect them. But they are not an indispensable
party in this Court's opinion as far as the underlying
decision that was made concerning the installation of the
facility at Echo.
(A. 1:2 Ins. 9-15 [emphasis added].)

To so rule, the trial court

had to ignore the precedent set by finding a violation of the
Development Code in the placement of the Facility.

As construed

by the plaintiffs and Judge Noel, Judge Wilkinson held that the
Railroad's nonconforming use at Echo did not permit an accessory
use of loading customer materials onto railroad cars.
This action centers on the Railroad's use of its Echo rightof-way: whether surrounding AG-1 or RR-2 zoning displaces the
Railroad's preexisting nonconforming use.

The Railroad has a

substantial interest in assuring that the accessory use of its
property for loading continue despite the change in uses of
surrounding property.

The Railroad is clearly an indispensable

party to such a determination.
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VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADHERING TO PRIOR RULINGS AND
ORDERS OF JUDGE WILKINSON WHEN THE ERROR IN THOSE RULINGS
WAS DEMONSTRATED DURING THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
Judge Young, Judge Brian and Judge Noel each declined the
invitation to revisit the issues resolved by Judge Wilkinson
despite an expanded record and the manifest absence of any
justification for the earlier partial summary judgment.

Nothing

in the record indicates that they agreed with his ruling, but
they apparently felt bound in some fashion by the law of the case
doctrine.
Application of that doctrine arises frequently in Summit
County and other counties with rotating judge assignments.

See

Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah App.
1994); Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993) (Orme,
Ct. App. J. concurring).
of the case."

Judge Wilkinson/s ruling was not "law

While generally "a judge cannot overrule the

decision of another judge of the same court,"

DeBry v. Valley

Mortgage Co. , 835 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah App. 1992),

,f

[t]he second

judge may reverse the first judge's ruling if the issues decided
by the first judge are presented to the second judge in a
^different light'. . . . "

Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil,

Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984).
Judge Orme of this Court, concurring in the Supreme Court
case of Gillmor v. Wright, supra,

offered the following critique

of the law of the case doctrine as applied to an erroneous ruling
of Judge Wilkinson in Summit County:
I believe [the law of the case doctrine] was viewed with
undue reverence by Judge Murphy, probably because the prior
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determination had been made by a fellow judge who previously
had the Summit County assignment• [Tjhis issue recurs with
some frequency in counties served by rotating judges. . . .
850 P.2d at 438.

In Gillmor, Judge Murphy had concluded that law

of the case "dictated" adherence to Judge Wilkinson's previous
ruling.

850 P.2d at 439.

Judge Orme argued that this view

produced "an unwarranted delay in delivering justice and
burden[ed] the appellate courts with issues that are capable of
expeditious resolution at the trial level":
The law of the case doctrine is not a limit on judicial
power, but only a practice designed "to protect both court
and parties against the burdens of repeated reargument by
indefatigable diehards." [Citations omitted.] "The
doctrine is not an inexorable command that rigidly binds a
court to its former decisions but rather is an expression of
good sense and wise judicial practice." [Citations
omitted.]
Id.
Judge Orme saw a practical difficulty with adherence to law
of the case in protracted litigation handled by different judges:
Simply put, the law of the case doctrine does not prohibit a
judge from catching a mistake and fixing it. [Citations
omitted.] . . .
If this had been Judge Murphy's case on his
Salt Lake County individual calendar, and he had entered
some interim order like Judge Wilkinson did, and he became
convinced at trial that he was wrong, he would not have
hesitated to fix it, relying on his fuller knowledge of the
matter, more complete briefing, or other circumstances
exposing the error. The happenstance that Summit County is
still on a master calendar, served by constantly rotating
judges, should not change that prerogative of the judge who
actually decides the case on its merits. . . . [T]he two
judges, while different persons, constitute a single
judicial office for law of the case purposes, namely, the
third district judge serving Summit County. (Emphasis
added.)
Judge Orme offered the following solution:
In situations like the one before us, a judge who recognizes
a mistake by the judge previously concerned with the same
case and yet fails to correct that mistake simply delays the
inevitable correction at the appellate level. In my view,
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if Judge Murphy could have deviated from his own prior
interim decision—and he clearly could have done so here—he
could have deviated from Judge Wilkinson's, And he could
have done so with certainty that this court would not
reverse a second judge's sound correction of a prior error
on the basis that the correction was not in accordance with
the law of the case established by the first judge.
Id.

at 439-40 (Orme, Ct. App. J. concurring)
This rationale has subsequently been followed in this Court.

See

Trembly, supra,

884 P.2d at 1311 (where the ruling on summary

judgment was not a final order, the second rotating judge was not
precluded from reevaluating the prior ruling).

The facts of

record simply did not support Judge Wilkinson's conclusion that
Summit County had violated its Development Code.

However, Judge

Noel felt constrained to embrace the partial summary judgment and
its implications.

This led to extensive proceedings at great

expense to the parties but of limited utility.
It is clear from the jury's nominal verdict and the Findings
and Conclusions Re: Equitable Relief ultimately entered by Judge
Noel that neither fact finder vindicated Judge Wilkinson's view
of the merits.

While these determinations now cap any relief

available upon retrial of this action, the trial need not have
occurred had the judges who handled the case after Judge
Wilkinson examined substantively the premises on which they were
proceeding.
VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT A CLAIM OP
NUISANCE PER SE CAN BE BASED ON AN ALLEGED LOCAL ZONING
VIOLATION.
Judge Noel, relying on Judge Wilkinson's implicit finding of

a violation of the Development Code, held the Facility to be a
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nuisance per se.

So instructed, the jury considered only the

issue of damages and returned a verdict of general damages
ranging from $1,500 to $5,000 per plaintiff for alleged injuries
spanning over six years.

The jury found no injury to property or

other special damages and no exemplary damages.

(A. 5)

Judge

Noel found that the Facility was not presently causing any injury
to the plaintiffs.

(A. 6)

To prove a nuisance per se, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that "the conduct creating the nuisance is also specifically
prohibited by statute. . . . "

Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d

144, 149 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
1994) .
per se.

denied,

883 P.2d 1359 (Utah

Violation of a county zoning ordinance is not a nuisance
Padien v. Shipley, 553 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1976)

("It

was error to deem a violation of the ordinance a nuisance per se,
viz., as a matter of law").
The trial court apparently viewed the language cited above
as nothing more than dicta.

However, the plaintiffs failed to

cite any authority holding a zoning violation alone as a
sufficient basis for finding a nuisance per se.

Further, the

plaintiffs did not identify a single instance of conduct on the
part of Utelite that constituted a violation of a "specific
statutory prohibition."

Erickson, 877 P.2d at 149.

In the words

of the Erickson court, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that
the legislature had "already struck the balance" between the
"relative interests of the plaintiff and defendant" in favor of
either party.

Id.

(citing Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939,
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943 (Utah 1990)).

Judge Noel's overly broad application of

nuisance per se should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The most obvious resolution of this appeal is to remand for
a hearing on the merits regarding fact issues improperly resolved
by Judge Wilkinson.

The results of the trial relating to damages

would continue to serve as a ceiling to any relief on tort
claims.
The Court may also choose to hold as matter of law that the
Facility is an accessory use to the Railroad's valid preexisting
use.

Such a holding comports with the record and would bring

this litigation to an end.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ 3 ^ a y of October, 1996.

WILLIAMS & HUNT

Jody K/]Burn<
Attorneys for Defendants/
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Eric C. Olson
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Appellant Utelite Corporation
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SESSION
R U L I N G

3
4

THE COURT:

Well, let me indicate to you that I

5

have gone over the material, and the Court is still

6

vascillating somewhat as far as the situation is concerned.

7

But let me start to give you my ruling.

8
9

First of all, I am denying the Motion to Dismiss
on the question of standing.

I am also denying the Motion

10

that the Union Pacific Railroad is an indispensable party.

11

This Court is not convinced that it is.

12

into a contract with Utelite, and it will affect them.

13

they are not an indispensable party in this Court's opinion

14

as far as the underlying decision that was made concerning

15

the installation of the facility at Echo.

16

The parties entered
But

The Court is also of the opinion that the

17

plaintiffs do not have the responsibility here as far as

18

exhausting administrative remedies.

19

both counsel say on that.

20

administrative remedy is a situation where of course there

21

has been a zoning change or a question arises, then they have

22

to take that to the Board of Equalization for them to make

23

that decision and then take the course.

24
25

I agree with everything

But I think that the

I think that here we do have a situation involved
as far as a legal issue involving due process, a possible

OOO^Su

1

constitutional issue.

2

plaintiffs are not out of court on the Statute of Limitations

3

under the Open Meeting Law.

4

that the Open Meeting Law is the crux of this case either,

5

but I don't think they are out of court.

6

I also am of the opinion that the

I am not thoroughly convinced

Now, we get to the Motion for Summary Judgment,

7

and I am having a hard time rationalizing in my mind that the

8

County did not violate the office as far as the development

9

laws, the Development Code and the Zoning Code as far as the

10

properties are concerned.

11

president of Utelite walked into a meeting and discussed this

12

and then the administrator sends him a letter and says, Go

13

ahead and do it, that it's a permitted use, it just doesn't

14

wash with this Court that the activities can be carried on in

15

that manner.

16

And also, when you say that the

But I am also mulling over in my mind as to the

17

many factual issues that might be there.

18

this -- and counsel has argued that the parties had not been

19

injured.

20

guess a factual issue could be that they were parties that

21

have or are in the realm of injury or as he used the term,

22

the quality of life.

23

By that I am saying

I think he has a point to a certain extent.

But I

And of course it's argued that the Development

24

Code is a factual issue.

But yet it really boils down to a

25

question of whether they adhered to that Code or they did not

nnn^tt

1

adhere to the Code, and the question of whether it's a

2

permitted use under the Code or it was a nonconforming use.

3

And I am not persuaded.

4

factual issue that's present as far as the Development Code

5

is concerned.

6

I am not persuaded that there is a

I guess what I am saying and in talking to myself

7

and making my decision here, that this Court is of the

8

opinion that the Motion by the plaintiff is well taken, that

9

the Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

10

The Court

does grant their Motion for Summary Judgment.

11

However, I do decline to grant their Motion for a

12

Cease and Desist Order and for a Writ of Injunction.

13

don't know what the parties intend to do concerning this

14

matter -- I probably think I do.

15

that cease and desist order, that could put them out of

16

business.

17

appellate procedure.

18

further injured by that, but I think that that could be some

19

monetary damages.

20

Motion for Summary Judgment but refuse to grant the Motion

21

for Injunctive Relief to cease and desist

22

That I

But I think that if I issue

It could do irreparable damages to them during the
And I think that the parties could be

And therefore, I am going to grant the

However, I will indicate that if this matter is

23

not taken further, within 30 or 60 days, that the injunctive

24

relief would be granted.

25

to appeal the case, but in my own mind I can see that there

And I am certainly not advising you

000^

1

is probably not much chance that you are not going to.

2

MR. NIELSEN:

Would the Court mind restating or

3

explaining its ruling with respect to the time limit, the 60

4

days?

I didn't quite understand.

5

THE COURT:

Well, I said 30 or 60 days.

I am

6

saying that if the defendants did not make the decision to

7

appeal this case within 30 days, then the Injunction and

8

Cease and Desist Order would be placed into effect.

9

appeal is filed, then it would not be granted pending the

10
11
12

If an

disposition of the appeal.
MR. APPEL:

So essentially you are giving them a

stay of 30 to 60 days before effectiveness?

13

MR. NIELSEN:

14

THE COURT:

Is it 60 or 30?
I said 60 or 30.

15

how much time do you need?

16

think we better take 60 days.

17

MR. NIELSEN:

18

THE COURT:

Really I am saying,

I know these things take time.

I

I would much prefer 60.
I have no problem with that.

This has

19

been going on for two or three years now.

I have no problem

20

with that.

21

saying that I can see a devastating effect that that could

22

have on the company.

23

MR. APPEL:

Again, I am not advising you to appeal, but I am

Your Honor, by means of clarification,

24

you mentioned that I believe the Statute of Limitations did

25

not affect us with respect to the Open Meetings Act.

*

Did you

(Uhuu

1

find a violation of the Open Meetings Act?

2

THE COURT:

Yes.

I think the Open Meeting Law was

3

violated.

Well, first let me state this:

I don't think this

4

was ever put on the agenda.

5

Mr. Anderson says.

6

therefore there was no minutes.

7

individual to walk into their meeting and make a presentation

8

and then have their administrative officer respond to that,

9

that causes me concern.

And I can understand what

It wasn't put on the agenda, and
But for them to allow an

And I think that's a violation of --

10

maybe it wouldn't be strictly the Open Meeting Law, but it

11

would be a violation of the way their procedure was, the way

12

they were doing business concerning that.

13

gentleman came in, that they then should have excluded him

14

from that or put it in the minutes or set it up saying, You

15

can appear at the next meeting and present your request.

16

MR. APPEL:

Okay, your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

Any other questions?

18

MR. APPEL:

One final.

That when that

We asked for -- I guess

19

what you have done is you have ruled that the zoning decision

20

concerning Utelite is null and void because it was

21

incorrectly done, but you are not ordering Summit County to

22

proceed with the cease and desist.

23

it is null and void.

24

THE COURT:

25

But you have ruled that

That is correct.

That is correct.

I purposely am not issuing the injunctive relief.

But

1
2

MR. APPEL:

But the declarations that I asked for

have been granted?

3

THE COURT:

Yes.

4

MR. APPEL:

Okay.

5

THE COURT:

Any other questions?

6

MR. APPEL:

No, your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

Mr. Appel, would you prepare the

8

pleadings and Findings of Facts?

9

MR. APPEL:

I will.

10

THE COURT:

If there is nothing further, then court

11
12

will be in recess.
(This concludes this Bench Ruling at 4:15 p.m.)

13
]_4

* * *
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19
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22
23
24
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5
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6
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7

and for the State of Utah.

8
9
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10

Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Homer

11
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12
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13
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14
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15
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16
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1993
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. HARPER,
FRANK CATTELAN, RICHARD RICHINS,
and ETHEL S. RAYMOND,
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******
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FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW °"^Qifj

Plaintiffs,
v.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body politic, the
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION, and the
SUMMIT COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION,
and UTELITE CORPORATION,

Civil No, 10718
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants,

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing July
8, 1991, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.

The

Plaintiffs were represented by Jeffrey W. Appel of Haley &
Stolebarger, Defendants Summit County was represented by Franklin
P. Anderson and Defendant Utelite Corporation was represented by
John T. Nielsen.

Argument was heard with respect to Defendant

Utelite and Summit County's Motions to Dismiss and Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Having heard the arguments

of counsel and being fully advised of the premises, the Court
makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court hereby adopts the following Findings of Fact:
1.

In the Fall of 1988, Defendant Utelite Corporation

(hereinafter "Utelite") decided to relocate a railroad loadout
facility (hereinafter "Utelite facility") to Echo, Utah.

4^\

2.

On December 13, 1988, Utelite went before the Summit

County Planning Commission seeking approval for construction of
the facility in Echo.
3.

The posted agenda for the December 13, 1988 meeting of

the Planning Commission provides no notice to the public that
there would be a discussion concerning the proposed relocation
and construction of the Utelite facility.
4.

The minutes of the December 13, 1988 meeting of the

Planning Commission contain no reference to a discussion or any
testimony concerning the proposed relocation and construction of
the Utelite facility.
5.

Utelite received verbal permission at the December 13,

1988 meeting of the Planning Commission to begin construction of
the facility.
6.

On January 13, 1989, Jack Willis on behalf of Robert

McGregor, Chairman of the Planning Commission, sent a letter to
Utelite confirming a discussion at the December 13, 1988 meeting
of the Planning Commission regarding the proposed relocation of
the Utelite facility.
7.

The January 13, 1989 letter indicated that it was the

consensus of the Planning Commission that the Utelite operation
could be moved to the Echo location and would be considered a
"permitted use" at the Echo site.
8.

Construction of the Utelite facility began on or about

February 21, 1989 at a location directly across from and adjacent
to a residential area of Echo in which Plaintiffs reside.
2

OUU^VJ

9.

On February 28, 1989, Utelite applied for and received

from Summit County, building permit # 89007, which is
specifically designated as an "electrical permit."
10.

The Utelite facility was substantially completed by

April 25, 1989, at which time the first loading of railroad cars
took place.
11.

In October 1989, Utelite made application for a

building permit from Summit County, which permit was issued on
November 28, 1989 as building permit # 89291 for the construction
of the loadout facility in Echo.

CONCLUSION
The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that:
1.

Plaintiffs have standing to maintain this action

pursuant to the terms of the Summit County Development Code, the
laws of the State of Utah and the Constitution of the State of
Utah.
2.

Union Pacific Railroad is not an indispensable party to

this action.
3.

Plaintiffs in this instance were not required to

exhaust administrative remedies for the reason that due process
and other constitutional rights are involved and were violated.
4.

The statute of limitations contained in the open

meeting law Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1 et seq. has not been violated
due to application of the equitable tolling doctrine.
5.

The decision of Defendant Summit County concerning the
3

000d6u

approval of utilization of the site currently occupied by Utelite
Corporation was in violation of the provisions of the Summit
County Development Code and, thus, that decision is null and
void,
6.

The decision of Defendant Summit County concerning the

approval of utilization of the site currently occupied by Utelite
Corporation was made in violation of the provisions of the Open
Meeting Act Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1- et seq.
7.

Injunctive relief requiring the County to ensure the

removal of the Utelite facility is granted with the stay of the
effectiveness of that portion of this order for sixty (60) days
from the date of this order.
DATED this >13

day of August, 1993.

Honorable Homer .F^'Wilkinson V ~

*i O 2
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AUG 23
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1993

of

Sum, "•»'> Co,

°^W
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. HARPER,
FRANK CATTELAN, RICHARD RICHINS,
and ETHEL S. RAYMOND,

ORDER FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body politic, the
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION, and the
SUMMIT COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION,
and UTELITE CORPORATION,

Civil No. 10718
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary judgment is granted and that the actions
of Defendant Summit County with respect to the zoning decision
allowing Utelite to occupy its current site was accomplished in
violation of law, the Summit County Development Code, and the Open
Meeting's Act and is thus null and void for the following reasons:
1.

The acts and omissions of the Defendants leading to the

emplacement of the Utelite Facility in Echo, Utah, were contrary to
the Summit County Development Code and are therefore null and void.
2.

Defendants actions were in violation of the Open and

Public Meeting's law, Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1 et seq.
3.

Defendants acts and omissions have harmed Plaintiffs

without providing them due process of law.

OOiMb.-

i*rL-'

4.

The effectiveness of this order is stayed for sixty'(60)

days from the date this order is entered.

If no appeal is taken

within that time period, then an injunction shall issue and
Defendant Summit County shall be required to effectuate the removal
of Utelite from their currently occupied site.
5.

Defendant

Utelite

Corporation

and

Defendant

Summit

County's Motions to Dismiss are denied.
DATED this

day of August, 1993.
So Ordered:

f

"*P1FfcA+fiQf)f>*rL

Honorable Homer F. W ^ K ^ ^ c S / ^ V ^

000^8.
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John T. Nielsen (#2408) "
Eric C. Olson (#4108) (/
Attorneys for Defendant Utelite Corporation
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333

FILE D
SEP'/ 193$

jfcK

By..
Deputy Cterk
$c

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY

M

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 90-03-10718
Honorable Pat B. Brian

vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION and
UTELITE CORPORATION,
Defendants.

On May 30, 1995, this Court heard argument in the
above matter with respect to the various motions of the parties
for partial summary judgment on claims and defenses in this
action.

The plaintiffs were represented by James L.

Warlaumont.

The Summit County defendants were represented by

Jody K Burnett and Franklin P. Andersen.

The defendant Utelite

Corporation ("Utelite") was represented by Eric C. Olson.

By

agreement of the parties, the hearing took place in Salt Lake
City, Utah rather than in Summit County, Utah.

s

132X77758 1

(P

i«T.&

STATE OF UTAH
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D.
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN,
RICHARD RICHINS and THE
DICKER HILL TRUST,

m

BOOKTTPAGE 7 5 4

The Court having reviewed the submissions of the
parties, having heard the argument of counsel and being
otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Utelite7 s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

the claim of nuisance per se is denied.
2.

Utelite' s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

the claim of trespass is denied.
3.

Utelite's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

the claim of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress is granted.

There exists no genuine issue of material

fact with respect to the alleged outrageousness of Utelite' s
conduct and Utelite is entitled to judgment on the Tenth Cause
of Action as a matter of law.

Nothing in this Order, however,

shall limit the plaintiffs from claiming damages for emotional
distress under their nuisance and trespass claims.
4.

Utelite's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

the claim for attorney' s fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-56 is granted and the Eleventh Cause of Action is
dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs' renewing said
claim after the conclusion of trial.
5.

The plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment on Utelite' s defenses of estoppel, waiver and laches
is denied.
6.

The Court reserves until after the jury trial

herein any ruling on Summit County' s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the claim for award of attorney' s fees and costs

MKT r t t t t 7 5 5
132X77758 1

IAAM

X

T

u n d e r 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988 as w
54-2-9.

,
DATED this

iC>

,•] ,;•//*^'-

day of ^giis-t/ 1995.

Pat B. Brian, Judc^e
Third Judicial D i s t r i c t
Summ i t Coi inty
Approved

as to Form:

Actornevc:

^£2'

f n r ^1 a i j p f i ^ ^ s

-J±

Attorneys rnor Summit County
)efendants

BOOKTTPAGE 7 5 6
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ADDENDUM A-5
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Clerk ot Summit L uumy
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMffctT C U L ^ ^ C t e r k " " " ~ ^
STATE OF UTAH

JANE HAEFZR, RICHARD D.
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN,
RICHARD RJ CHINS and THE
DICKER "T- r TRUST

FINAL'JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL
VERDICT
Civi] No. 90-03-10711

Plaintiffs,

Judge Frank

vs.

*. Noe]

SUMMIT COUNTY, a uody
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION and
UTELITE CORPORATION,

*- L /

Delundants.
CM ,

*•

The d a m a g e claims b y the pi aintiffs h e r e i n against
the defendant
i^l
tiit evidence

'Ti"cl i t^- Corporation

tried I *» ,i j n >\ in 1

'-• ^.'-'-i -LA through J'•», 1 9 9 5 . T h e Court a l s o heard
\ . ^ L L respect to t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' claim, f o r

equitabl •'" r^l; ^ t supplementn>
,;w.-; i-

WPIT

:.

.

r el :i ef al ready

iuLion.

Judge Frank G. Noel presided at. the trial
plaint, \ f fr

we?

d e f ei idai =:

:

•

' •-. •-.-.

r e p r e s e n t e e ;;y Li:,.

enters i \
remaining

representr-.i

inai Judgment
-i

:

-:

, -,-isoiJ.

The

,mm< "ill

'I'll-

1'he Coui L n o w

:., this action d i s p o s i n g of a l l

a i ms 1 r 1 :- " -

• * • •.

i5eiCi.e tiiu c o m m e n c e m e n t of t r i a l , the Court
d e t e r m i n e d tha*

the Oixler G r a n t i n g Partial Summary

e n t e r e d o n A u g u s t 2 3 , .i.-;v;

-• -

: -.

Judgment

ILJ;

11

Wd Ikinson Order") was law of the cas- and, h\

Wilkinson -'*r»i'

implication, the

i ru* 1 u-i« • ^ Mv 1 find "Mia *-;"if *~ ^n Utelite loading

f a c :i 1 :i t y
Code.

i \-

Bast-o

ihi:- i iodine implicit-

L

op me n t

t :- Wilkinson Order,

the Court tijrt-'^r h^TH <-hnf th~ Utelite loading facility in
• - •_ , . . . <*.

Eel io, I Jta
Th«

.•.^/t.i.-s thereafter stipr]uted t

the dismissal
]

'

without p ^ judi.ee of -J~1 ] r^T.ni^ir.-

' ieuiies 01 1 ~ a'

nuisance,

advanced bv tn*j plaintilfs

respass ana n^g^^gci.cc

against the delendant UteJite Corpora: i-'i;.

This stipulation

•.-I . i.mson ;^ ^. : . uiajil. jii^ i • *.. t JCII !)u,.ifii) Luugmcn
defendant

utelite expressly waived it, right

UJLSIUISSCLI

Wll.ii iil
The-

punitive

.ssu^

ot
-T-

.lability
•

•

.

-

•

wiLii u i p r e j u d i c e ,

Ir-iru

•'-•

;

p

:

<- ; • ' • • < • ]

answer

o n l y ehe

the

- M i

i

issues

•/

4

or

of

, . g

actual

•• a r . s w ^ r e d a s

foll'jwina

questions

:.

111 i :.- 1 c-i

2

as a matter

and

;:• i s i d o r a t i o n by t fte i u ^ y .

•*

evld« n e e p r e p o n d e r a t e s

resolved
:

a iJj L-vhai V e x d i c i , \%,>.•
Please

22U8OO50.1
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:

d a m a g e s woi e s u b n n ' e^ f o r

dS p<Ai.t x.:

the bar

piejudict-.

.

ei-Sheeee^

*o assert

The

i ne

issue

.indicated:
from

a

presented,

answer

"Yes "

If

you f i n d

the

evidence

s o e q u a l l y ba LarK^d - -..;•

v i cannot determine

p:-r

-

- -u-.\ .-I!J. ••

.

the evidence preponderates
pres^nted,

answer

"N-* ''

I i: i;

A

: e,

c i: :i f y ou f i i id t h a t
1

• <• g a i n s t
"!so,

a

he

issu<-

dn," -'^macros : ^P*-.-:.^ ( -

; <_p'_:. j e r a n c e

._,: Li:t - V . . J U L , : L .

WCJi~~: Utel i t: < • I oadi r: T f aci 11 •• y a p r o x i m a t e
cause of d a m a a e s t o :
Ri.'i.

. i:(., , • •

Yes

X

No

Jane Harper

Yes_, X

No

Frank

Vrj

7

"al'telan

s

..

-^

Richard Kicnins &
v

the D i c k e r Hill Trust

-?- ,,

r

o

vou answered question ;: •. "y--.sM as L D any of
the p l a i n t i f f s tli'-n go o n to the next: q u e s t i o n s .
Ofhr:* T 'se hav«
a* v

*

'°

opersoi: 1

]•:

' '-e '-r*rn

.urn to * ii^ courtroom.
!i y o u answered question #1 " y e s " as t o a n y

of tho p l i i n t i f f s then as t• :> t: 1 iat p ] a 1 nt::i ff a i lswer
t •

a questions;
What amount

p]ai r '
1 ,

Ar

'fp.

^< n-oney w,i ] ] fairly compensate the

i' } d-rr- -K- • si ista :i ned a s a r>-

•:,.;.;;... y I^J . .;s operation?
General Damages:

(adverse health effects,

inconvenience, annoyance, discoinf i-*
22U80050.1
02/13/96

uamiPAGF 902

.1 oss of

<•:.,

:

:cni. -..: home and property., mental distress and

emotional

in jury to the dat<_ of trial.)

Richard

Harper

J ane Harper

^5,

Frank Ca11elan

$3,Juu

Richard
the Dicker Hill Trust

n .. L~or

Ricucii u and Jane Harper
Frank Cat:tP 1 a n
R i ch ar d Ri chins &
the Dicker Hill Trust
I josp < if

fVuslnesi-

I n c o m e '.

Frank Cattelan

$

0_

Considering all the evidence in the case, do
you find from, cl ear and convlncinc -vi-di-*.--plai i rti f f s ai: e ei i1 L L iea no an awaia
exemplary damages, against Utelite
Answer:

Yes

The Court having reviewed *-h
~j 111 v

"- t

i p^::i» j.ve and

Corporation?
No

X

;r>/~ - -

! ii, iv i iii" | hiMiil 1 IK1 t M/ i (j(.niij«j a/ M - >, navjug considered the

argument and submissions of counsel an.; beinc
and sufficient"':
I

r

therwise duly

advised,
^iMd) -M<r.kKi; . . i A D J U D G E D a s f o l l o w s :
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1.

; . ,.:.; , ; i -lane H a r p e r i s a w a r d e d "judgment

a g a i n s t th<*- d e r e n d a n t
f/1-

, * > • - * orcst
jiii*

2.

U: e l i t e C o r p o r a t i o n
t h e r e o n ix

-.

in

:

he amount

. . , . , . .

rr_, ;.,

i - r . ..

.

Yhe plaintiff Richard Harper is awarded

judgment a a ^ r , / a

M;.

1 J

-i-.i

'

•

:

. : n :i i: 1 tl le

... . . i.terest theitiu) at the statutory rate
iron; r.he date

f tins Judgment .

3.

judgmo:/

i .

•

.jwaia^-i

iigajn. *. the d»-itndani Uteiitie Corporation ::; \he

amount of £*-'.'•
from tne

with interest thereon at the statutory rate

'* •

'

4.
Hi] 3 '/rust aTd
Ut:e3 ! J -

; ;: -i.t.

/he pJ a i in; i f I s Richard Richins and r he Dicker
iuintlv awarded judgment agains** *"u-~ 1*- 'V* n.r:

: >

•,

.. . ntei^st

thereon at. 1- h^ .statutory rate from th*- iatt* ••: this Judgment .
5.

Wirn respect '• ^

1u

> ; • i^riffn

.

- >r

pj'or/--^

,'.,,«.

Jnagiunn

>> nei'-by entered ,n favoi oi * he defendant Utelite

t

t, ,

•• ' --

CJMJ

;,uLit.,.ve damages,

Corporation and against the plaintiffs and said clai ins are
dismii s.1-- • :

e
fj court, does no! grant

'/i^ plaintiffs any

equitable relief apart from such equitable r~1 : -

BOOKU U PAGE 9 0 4
221X80050.1
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= "Le

plaintiffs may be entitled to pursuant to the terms of the
Wilkinson order.

DATED this

/ Q

day of Dtovefflfeer, 1996

Frank G. Noel,
Third J u d i c i a l
Summit County

Distriht^^W&ii/,^
D i s t r i A ^ S A ^
AsS**
%^%
£&$ «...
<t^"i.
rO =

22U80050.1
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ADDENDUM A-6

NO.

F I LE D
MAY 1 7 1996
ClerK of Summit County

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

E r i c C. Olson (#4108) "'

ty-

A t t o r n e y s for Defendant U t e l i t e Corporation
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333

& DeputyOterk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D.
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN,
RICHARD RICHINS and THE
DICKER HILL TRUST,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
RE: EQUITABLE RELIEF

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 90-03-10718
vs Honorable Frank G. Noel
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION and
UTELITE CORPORATION,
Defendants

The Court heard evidence at the trial in this action
held on September 12 through 15, 1995.

The Court has issued

Minute Entries dated February 13, 1996 and April 25, 1996 with
respect to the plaintiffs' claim for equitable relief
supplementary to any such relief already awarded in this
action.

The Court has also entered its Final Judgment of

Special Verdict resolving, inter

alia,

for equitable relief.

•i

•J < >

the plaintiffs' claim

On the basis of the jury's verdict and the Court's
independent determination of facts based on its view of the
evidence presented at trial including a personal view of the
properties in question, the Court now enters the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendant Utelite Corporation ("Utelite")

operates a loading facility (the "Facility") adjacent to the
Union Pacific railroad tracks at Echo, Utah.
2.
the Facility.

The plaintiffs own property in the vicinity of
The Union Pacific railroad tracks that run

through Echo, Utah lie between the Facility and the property
owned by Jane Harper, Richard D. Harper and Frank Cattelan.
Trains go through Echo, Utah on these tracks in excess of
fifteen to twenty times per day.
3.

At the Facility on a weekly basis, Utelite loads

an average of six and one-half railroad cars with its kiln
dried aggregate products.
4.

Semi-trucks transport the aggregate product to

the Facility for loading.

It takes four trucks approximately

forty minutes to load a single railroad car.
5.

The Utelite Facility currently operates, with

occasional exceptions, on weekdays during daylight hours.

132X86300 1
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6.

To deal with dust from the loading operations,

Utelite has taken the following steps:
a.

Construction of a metal enclosure at the

Facility.
b.

Installation of a bag house and duct work

at the Facility.
c.

Paving of the access road to the Facility.

d.

Installation of curtains and an electric

door at the Facility.
e.

Watering down aggregate at the Utelite

plant.
f.

Installation of a hood and metal coverings

over the conveyor belt and drop areas at the
Facility.
g.

Response to resident complaints called in

to the Utelite plant including termination of
loading on windy days.
7.

To deal with noise problems from the operation

of the Facility, Utelite has taken the following steps:
a.

Installation of a muffler on the bag house.

b.

Instruction to truckers not to bang

railroad cars in connection with loading.
8.

To deal with other annoyances, Utelite has:
a.

Removed outdoor lighting at the Facility.

b.

Terminated night loading.

c.

Instructed truck drivers to yield to other

vehicles seeking access to the frontage road on
the far side of Interstate 84 through the road
at the Facility.
9.

As a result of the actions taken by Utelite,

confirmed by the Court's visit to the Facility while in
operation and the Court's and third-party's review of videos,
tapes and photographs of the Facility in operation, the
Facility at present (a) is not injurious to the plaintiffs, (b)
does not adversely affect the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of
their property, and (c) does not cause any property damage to
the plaintiffs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has equitable power pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-38-1 to enjoin or abate any nuisance created by
Utelite at the Facility.
2.

The Court has found solely by reason of Judge

Wilkinson's August 23, 1993 Order and the findings implicit in
that ruling that the Facility is a nuisance per se.
3.

Notwithstanding the Court's finding that the

Facility is a nuisance per se, in order to obtain further
equitable relief from this Court with respect to the present
operation of the Facility, the plaintiffs have the burden of
proving that the Facility presently is injurious to their

132\86300 1
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health, is offensive to the senses, or obstructs the free use
and enjoyment of their property.
4.

The plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden

of proof and are not entitled to any further equitable relief
from this Court other than the equitable relief previously
granted by Judge Wilkinson.

DATED t h i s /ffi

day of

Frank G. Noel, Dis
Third Judicial Dis v N „ w
Summit County
^0$^
Approved as to Form:

l^f
=cc|

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

""''<f%\

SUMMIT""^
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BJMMTT COUN JTT
8TA.TB @F OTJJ
P.O. B O X 1 2 8
COALVILLE, U T A H
84017

< .

i 11« • M

(801)330-445!

January I. 7 , 19-9

Carsten Mortpn.sen

p.o.

n

ox :e?

C o a l v i l l e , UT
RE:

P.J017

P.eloc-ricn of Uteiitp Fnnili t-i^s

Dear Mr. Morter.ren:
This i s to confirm a ciscussion at. tit? December 15th Planning Commission
meetinr reparriin.R the relocation of rhe f a c i l i t i e s .
I t WPS the c o n ^ n s u s of tht- Commiscicr. that the U t e l i t e ci:-ration presently s^tup in Vanship on the Union Pacific railroad lines could he moved to the Echo
location. This would be considered a permitted use a t the Echo c i t e .
If you hnvp any questions pl°ase c a l l the Summit County Planning Office a t
v-:,6-«i/i^1 pyr, y v .
Sinc^Qely,

Pohor" '• v.o: . •-. r~.^ r*

Summit Coun ty Planninr Commission

00012J
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VlIT COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICh
SUMMIT COUNTY COURTHOUSE
P.O. BOX 128
COALVILLE, UTAH 84017
TELEPHONE (801) 336-4468

ROBERT W. ADKINS
SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY
TERRY L CHRISTIANSEN
\SSISTANT SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY

FRANKLIN P. ANDERSEN
DEPUTY. SUMMII COUNTY ATTORNEY
ALOMA M EBCANBRACK
PARALEGAL

^H/SlT

-^

,V

U"
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February 13, 1990

Jeffrey W. Appel
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
Tenth Floor, Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1956
RE:

Union Pacific
Echo, Utah

Utelite Loading Facility

Dear Jeff:
By way of direct answer to your concerns previously expressed,
please be advised that your requested actions of Summit County
authorities to issue immediate "cease and desist orders to
Utelite Corporation" and to initiate a zoning or rezoning process
for the Echo area have been thoroughly reviewed by this office.
For the following reasons, neither action was found appropriate
at this time.
Although much dialogue has been devoted to characterizing the
Utelite Loading Facility as existing contrary to County zoning
requirement, such characterization is, in my opinion, incorrect
and misfocused. I don't believe we are concerned with a zoning
issue, but rather a use issue. I have therefore reviewed your
request in light of the question of whether loading aggregate
into train cars is a use associated with railroading activities
in the Echo railroad yards.
In this instance, the railroad yard uses are non-conforming as
defined in Summit County's Development Code, Section 1.6(52).
Transportation of freight is the very essence of the railroad
business; loading and unloading of freight is fundamental to that
activity and is necessarily performed in yards or depots. The
activity of Utelite Corporation is a "use customarily incidental

£^n

i\

J e f f r e y 17 . A c z e 1
F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 1990
Page 2

to and 1ooa t
use and d e v :
It is thus a
m a i n r a 11 r o a
S e c t i o n 1.6 f €

: upon the s =. r?. e . . . • o r o o e• 3 • . . o c c u p id e b y t h e m a :
:d e x c l u s i v e l y to the ma
use of the p r e m i s e s . "
a c c e s s o r y *J r e subordina
y e t e s s e n t l a l , to t h e
D e v e 1 o p m e r.z Code,
n g use.
See Sumr.it Cou;
2 )

Accordingly,
nv o k e t h e C : : n t y ' s p o 1 i •
have c o n c i s e : ! t h a t to
p o w e r s in a:*; . 11e mp t t o c ::?. p e 1 U t e 1 11 e C o r p o r a t i o n a n d / o r t h e
railroad t o
• a s e o p e r a z1 : n s o r t o m o v s u c h o p e r a t i o n s t o
another area
• o u 1 d be an u n r e a s o n a b l e - :•: e r c i s e of z r. e C o u n t y ' s
p o l i c e p o v; e r and an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t a k i n g of v e s t e d
property
riohts.

Sincerely,

Frafiklin P. Andersen
Deputy Summit County A

:c m e y

ame
cc:

Summit County
Jim Peterson
Susan Glasman

Commission

000201

